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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 









TIMOTHY S. PATTERSON, 
 
                                     Appellant 
____________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. No. 08-cr-00383) 
District Judge:  Honorable Christopher C. Conner 
____________ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
December 14, 2010 
 
Before:  RENDELL, JORDAN, and HARDIMAN, Circuit Judges. 
 
(Filed: December 16, 2010) 
____________ 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
____________ 
 
HARDIMAN, Circuit Judge. 
 Timothy S. Patterson appeals the District Court’s denial of his motion to suppress 





 Because we write for the parties, we recount only the essential facts.  We accept 
the facts as found by the District Court in toto because we find none of them “clearly 
erroneous.” 
 In May 2006, while in state prison on felony drug charges, Patterson was 
sentenced for different felonies committed while he was on parole in 2005.  The Dauphin 
County Court of Common Pleas sentenced Patterson to thirty-six months intermediate 
punishment with eleven and a half months in a Dauphin County work release center to be 
served after his release from state prison.  In April 2008, Patterson was released to the 
custody of the County with conditions of supervision that included electronic monitoring 
and consent to random searches of his person, property, and residence.  He was also 
prohibited from “possess[ing], us[ing], or hav[ing] available to [his] control . . . any 
contraband such as: stolen property, drugs and drug paraphernalia, [or] firearms” or 
“possessing or having available to [his] control . . . [o]ver $50.00 cash without a receipt.” 
 App. at 50, 55. 
 Within months of his release, Patterson removed his electronic monitoring 
bracelet, and a warrant was issued for his arrest.  On October 15, 2008, Probation Officers 
Tom Walton and Justin Anderson went to the Presidential Apartments in Swatara 
Township where they located a gray Cadillac matching the description of a vehicle 
allegedly used by Patterson.  After surveilling the car for approximately thirty minutes 
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without observing anything of interest, Walton and Anderson left the scene.  They 
returned several hours later to continue their surveillance, and after approximately forty-
five minutes, they observed a man they believed to be Patterson approach the car.  The 
man placed a small child in the car, entered the vehicle, and started the engine.  Once the 
man was inside the car, the officers approached, visually confirmed that he was Patterson, 
and ordered him to turn off and exit the vehicle. 
 Patterson complied with the order to remove the keys from the ignition, but he then 
took hold of the child and refused to exit the car.  Walton opened the driver’s side door, 
grabbed Patterson’s arm, and removed him from the vehicle.  Anderson took control of 
the child, and Walton handcuffed Patterson.  A search of Patterson’s person revealed that 
he was in possession of a small quantity of marijuana and $480 in cash. 
 While the officers were in the process of arresting Patterson, two women 
approached and Patterson repeatedly instructed them to get in the car and drive away.  
The women did not comply, and the car remained in the parking lot with the driver’s side 
door open.  Anderson then informed Walton that he could see a firearm in the driver’s 
side door compartment.  Walton had not yet noticed the firearm, but upon looking at the 
door saw that “it was very visible.”  App. at 75, 124. 
 Walton placed Patterson in the back of the officers’ vehicle, and Anderson called 
the Swatara Township police, who arrived several minutes later and secured the firearm.  
Walton then attempted to get Patterson’s consent to a search of the vehicle, but Patterson 
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refused.  Nevertheless, Walton still “believe[d] that there could possibly be other criminal 
activity parole violations within the vehicle and [he] began to search the immediate area 
of the driver’s seat.”  App. at 77.  The search turned up a bag of crack cocaine in the car’s 
center console. 
 Although the officers’ search was conducted for the purpose of finding evidence 
that Patterson had violated terms of his supervised release, it yielded evidence sufficient 
for a grand jury to indict Patterson on new federal charges of possession of cocaine base 
with intent to distribute, 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), possession of a firearm in furtherance of 
drug trafficking, 18 U.S.C. § 924(c), and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, 18 
U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).  Patterson moved to suppress the evidence seized from the vehicle, 
claiming that the firearm was not in plain view and that the officers’ decision to wait until 
Patterson was in the car before arresting him was a pretext for searching the car incident 
to arrest.  The District Court denied his motion, finding that under Supreme Court 
precedent, including New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454 (1981), the officers’ safety 
concerns justified their seizure of the firearm and search of the entire car.  The District 
Court also rejected Patterson’s “pretext” argument, citing Whren v. United States, 517 
U.S. 806, 812-13 (1996), for the proposition that “an officer’s subjective motivation is 
incapable of invalidating behavior that is objectively justifiable.”  App. at 128. 
 After a two-day jury trial, Patterson was convicted of possession with intent to 
distribute cocaine base, possession of a firearm in furtherance of drug trafficking, and 
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possession of a firearm by a felon.  He was sentenced to 280 months in prison.  This 
appeal followed.1
 Patterson contends that the District Court erred in denying his motion to suppress 
the evidence seized by Officers Walton and Anderson because their search violated his 
Fourth Amendment rights under the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Arizona v. Gant, 
129 S. Ct. 1710 (2009), which limited the circumstances under which automobile 




 “This Court reviews the District Court’s denial of a motion to suppress for clear 
error as to the underlying factual findings and exercises plenary review of the District 
Court’s application of the law to those facts.”  United States v. Perez, 280 F.3d 318, 336 
(3d Cir. 2002) (citing United States v. Riddick, 156 F.3d 505, 509 (3d Cir. 1998)).  
“[W]hen a party asks us to affirm a district court’s suppression ruling[,] . . . we may 
  
                                                 
1 The District Court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3231.  We have jurisdiction 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, which grants “courts of appeals . . . jurisdiction of appeals 
from all final decisions of the district courts of the United States.” 
 
2 Although the officers’ search of Patterson’s car and the District Court’s denial of 
Patterson’s motion to suppress both predate Gant, Patterson may still appeal based on 
Gant’s holding because “a decision of [the Supreme] Court construing the Fourth 
Amendment is to be applied retroactively to all convictions that were not yet final at the 
time the decision was rendered.”  United States v. Johnson, 457 U.S. 537, 562 (1982); see 
also United States v. Shakir, 626 F.3d 315 (3d Cir. 2010) (analyzing, in light of Gant, a 
search and district court suppression determination from 2007 and 2008).  Patterson was 




affirm for any reason supported by the record.”  United States v. Dupree, 617 F.3d 724, 
728 n.2 (3d Cir. 2010). 
A 
 We first address the officers’ “plain view” seizure of the gun found in the driver’s 
side door of the Cadillac.  The Supreme Court stated in Horton v. California: 
It is, of course, an essential predicate to any valid warrantless seizure of 
incriminating evidence that the officer did not violate the Fourth 
Amendment in arriving at the place from which the evidence could be 
plainly viewed.  There are, moreover, two additional conditions that must 
be satisfied to justify the warrantless seizure.  First, not only must the item 
be in plain view; its incriminating character must also be ‘immediately 
apparent.’ . . .  Second, not only must the officer be lawfully located in a 
place from which the object can be plainly seen, but he or she must also 
have a lawful right of access to the object itself. 
 
496 U.S. 128, 136-37 (1990) (citations omitted); see also United States v. Yamba, 506 
F.3d 251, 256 (3d Cir. 2007) (“As the Supreme Court has said, precedent has ‘come to 
reflect the rule that if, while lawfully engaged in an activity in a particular place, police 
officers perceive a suspicious object, they may seize it immediately.’” (quoting Texas v. 
Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 739 (1983) (plurality opinion))). 
 All of the requirements of the plain view doctrine are met in this case.  First, the 
officers had a warrant for Patterson’s arrest, so they were authorized to remove him from 
the vehicle.  Second, Walton testified that the firearm was “very visible” and the District 
Court found it was “readily accessible in the driver’s side door compartment.”  App. at 
127.  Moreover, the “incriminating character” of the firearm was “immediately apparent” 
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because, as an individual on supervised release, Patterson’s possession of a weapon 
constituted an automatic violation of the terms of his release.3  Finally, the officers had a 
“lawful right of access” to the firearm because it was in an open car, visible, and 
accessible to anyone in the public area outside of the Presidential Apartments.4
                                                 
3 The officers had information that Patterson used the gray Cadillac regularly, and 
they observed him sit in the car for fifteen to twenty seconds.  It was therefore reasonable 
for them to conclude that, even if the car did not technically belong to Patterson, he had 
constructive possession of it and its visible contents.  See United States  v. Cunningham, 
517 F.3d 175, 178 (3d Cir. 2008) (“Constructive possession exists if an individual 
knowingly has both the power and the intention at a given time to exercise dominion or 
control over a thing.”). 
 
4 Patterson argues that the officers waited until he entered the vehicle before 
arresting him as a pretext to search the vehicle.  The District Court correctly declined to 
analyze the officers’ subjective intent because, as the Supreme Court held in Whren, 
“[n]ot only have we never held, outside the context of inventory search or administrative 
inspection . . . that an officer’s motive invalidates objectively justifiable behavior under 
the Fourth Amendment; but we have repeatedly held and asserted the contrary.”  517 U.S. 
at 812; see also Horton, 496 U.S. at 130 (holding that the plain view doctrine can apply 
even when officers intentionally find evidence rather than come upon it inadvertently).  
Moreover, the District Court found as a matter of fact that the officers had a legitimate 
reason for waiting: they wanted to make sure that the man under observation entered the 
vehicle they had identified as one used by Patterson.  App. at 129 n.6. 
   
B 
 We now turn to the warrantless search of the vehicle.  According to Gant, law 
enforcement officials may conduct a warrantless search of a vehicle incident to arrest only 
(1) “when it is reasonable to believe that evidence of the offense of arrest might be found 
in the vehicle” or (2) “when the arrestee is unsecured and within reaching distance of the 
passenger compartment at the time of the search.”  129 S. Ct. at 1719. 
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 The offense for which Patterson was arrested in this case was his violation of the 
conditions of his supervised release.  Upon searching Patterson’s person, the officers 
found proof of two additional violations: possession of contraband (i.e., marijuana) and 
possession of more than $50.00 in cash.  The subsequent “plain view” seizure of the 
firearm confirmed another contraband violation, the evidence of which was located inside 
the vehicle.  During the arrest, Patterson instructed bystanders to drive his car away, 
providing additional circumstantial evidence that the car contained contraband.  Taken 
together, these factors gave the officers ample reason to believe that the car contained 
evidence that Patterson violated his conditions of release.  Accordingly, the District Court 
did not err in rejecting Patterson’s Gant argument. 
III 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the District Court’s denial of Patterson’s 
motion to suppress evidence. 
